I'm a bad mid-wife to Locke and Strauss

So, here's my last essay - it was like giving birth - and being a man, I can just throw that kind of statement on the table.
Not much you can do about how painful I think child birth is - it's exactly like writing an essay on Strauss' treatment of Locke's doctrine of Natural right; right ladies?
Well, I'll just accuse those who say 'no it's not' as never having read Strauss on Locke . . .
So, enjoy, or hate, or just skip it - it's all good.


From Leo Strauss’ article, On Locke’s Doctrine of Natural Right, I will argue that Strauss shows Locke’s notion of natural law is a revolutionary idea that grounds its rules in reason rather than revelation by showing that natural law is not inherent in humanity, so it must come from a natural right that is dictated by reason – furthermore, that Locke’s account of the natural law fully informs his political philosophy.

To begin, Locke’s view of the natural law from the Essay Concerning Human Understanding is covered by a seemingly too obvious paradox. On the one hand, he states in order for the natural law to be a law, it must come and be known to come from God with sanctions of infinite weight and duration in the afterlife; however, on the other hand, Locke also says that reason cannot demonstrate the existence of another life. Not to be confused with an outright denial of God, from this, Locke is saying that natural reason does not demonstrate an afterlife that grounds our natural law – only through revelation do we get the precepts of a divinely inspired natural law. Of course, the paradox here is that we cannot have knowledge of a natural law through natural reason, that natural law is effectively unknowable. Strauss presses the matter of Locke’s attempt to discover natural law amidst the unreasonable notion of revelation. For whatever reason Locke had to submerse his notion of the natural law in revelation (The Crusades and Inquisition come to mind), his implicit notion of natural law remains clouded further still. In attempting to show that natural law could be rooted in natural reason and be concerned with public happiness, Strauss tells us of a partial law of nature that deals with such things. The partial law of nature is concerned with political happiness or a good of mankind that is relevant to this world – that is to say, it is based on natural reason and doesn’t presuppose the belief in an afterlife. It would seem that fulfilling political happiness would answer what is the perfection of our nature. As quickly as the premise lifts off, it is shot down – political happiness does not entail that the partial law of nature is anything but just that: partial. The law of nature must come from and be known to come from God, and in Locke’s example, the Chinese and Siamites are politically happy, yet they are unaware of God – naturally speaking, the partial law of nature restricts the conditions which a nation uses as a guide to be civil. It cannot be then, that the partial law of nature fulfills the perfection of our nature, otherwise it would be accessible and applicable to everyone. Thus far, we have not reached any law of nature aright, and it appears that Locke’s arguments are weak attempts of exposing the law of nature. But, as Strauss digs deeper, his exposition of Locke makes the argument very clear. Because Locke’s attempts to show natural law is so obviously paradoxical we can implicitly know that Locke believes, “If there is to be such a law this law must therefore consist of a set of rules whose validity does not presuppose life after death or belief in a life after death.”

Since there is no established law(s) of nature, there are no inherent rules, and from this we know that the rules are not “imprinted on the mind as a duty,” from God. In this instance, the rules of the law of nature become “practical principals . . . [that] continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing and which may be observed in all persons and all ages, steady and universal.” It happens to be the case that, “Nature . . . has put into man a desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery;” the desire appears to obtain continually and universally. This desire has the character of a natural right, and antedates all duties of man. If God is the creator, then the constant practical principals observed in everyone would be an effect of its creation. God has planted in man the pursuit of happiness and aversion to pain – in a word, the desire of self-preservation. All desires, all life, when in conflict necessarily leads to the influence of self-preservation. This right of nature, this desire, is foundational for the law of nature, because happiness presumes life and the right of self-preservation becomes the most fundamental right. Self-preservation, however, is not sufficient for the law of nature, because the act of self preservation requires man’s reason that teaches him what is necessary for that preservation. Happiness is the foundation for reason, which henceforth becomes the law of nature. Simply put, as a deviation from traditional views, as opposed to revelation, reason is said to be the natural law.
Much akin to the classical philosophers, who spoke from reason rather than the word of their deities, Locke takes up the charge of trying to find what is the perfection and excellency of our nature. To the classic philosophers, virtue was the fulfillment of our nature, yet they were unable to show a necessary connection between virtue and happiness without showing that the connection existed only in an afterlife. Even though there was never a discovered necessary connection between virtue and happiness, the classical philosophers and practically all men see there is a connection of happiness to virtue, and therefore the admission that happiness is connected to natural law. Because there is a visible connection between public happiness and a general compliance with several moral rules, philosophers and men are eager to point out the connection, but have not shown it to be a necessary connection – hence the dilemma Locke faces, and with the help of Strauss, we are shown that he eventually overcomes. The necessary (foundational) connection of happiness to the law of nature (reason), in Locke’s arguments goes to show that there is a necessary connection to the perfection of our nature and happiness.
According to this argumentation of Strauss’ exposition of Locke, we are informed of the reason that influences Locke’s formulation(s) of the law of nature. Most explicitly, Locke says that because of the law of nature, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” Reason, the activity founded on self-preservation continually dictates man to not harm one another in his life, liberty, and property. The precepts of Locke’s naming of the law of nature are as should be obvious, rooted in self-preservation. With much of Locke’s political philosophy, it begins with the state of nature. The state in which men are naturally in is also the state which Locke begins his reasoning for his notion of the law of nature. Men, naturally have perfect freedom – the freedom to “order their actions and dispose of their possessions . . . without . . . depending on the will of any other man.” Additionally, the state of nature is a state of equality, where no one naturally has a subordination or subjection over one another. All men are born with equal rank, with the same natural advantages and the same faculties, but most importantly have equality in reciprocal power and jurisdiction, “no one having more than another.” Since men are equal and free, but more importantly their power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, it becomes a necessity of reason that all men need be executors of the law of nature because of their (foundational) right to self preservation. It is by reason, therefore, that “every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the law of nature.” That is to say, every man has the right to protect the law of nature that says to not harm another in life, liberty, or property. This equality of being executioner of the law of nature establishes mutual security, so that if one person transgresses against another, he has the rest of humanity to fear, as jurisdiction is reciprocal. It is now the case that men are foundationally protected in their life and liberty, but Locke’s all important notion of property remains to be dealt with.

Property, a notion synonymous with Locke is of no small consequence in his political theory, and as such gets its own treatment in his treatise. For starters, God gave the world in common to all men, and they have an equal chance at the world through the spontaneous hand of nature. However, the general gift of the land must be procured privately for man to have particular use of it. Like the wild Indian who has no stead, yet has nourishment in fruits and meat not only has a claim to his spoils, they become a part of him. The annexation of the necessary subsistence becomes part of himself and also his property by mixing the provided resource with the property of himself – by mixing his ownership of his labour with the resource, it becomes a part of him and his property. That is to say that whatever man pulls out of the giving state of nature with his labour now becomes the proper owner of that, in the same way a man owns himself. By the property being an extension of the person, that person now privately owns that property. In the conjunction of self-preservation (and property-preservation) and reason, we are fully informed as to why Locke designates political power “to be a right of making laws with penalty of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defense of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good.”

It has now been shown how Locke’s notion of the natural right and laws are revolutionary and distinct from the traditional precepts of revelation. Also, the grounding of reason and self-preservation go on to inform and enforce Locke’s conception of political philosophy in the Second Treatise of Government.